It has been observed (e.g. Cooper (1979 ), Chierchia (1993 ), von Fintel (1994 ), Marti (2003 ) that the interpretation of natural language variables (overt or covert) can depend on a quantifier. The standard analysis of this phenomenon is to assume a hidden structure inside the variable, part of which is semantically bound by the quantifier. In this paper I argue that the presupposition of the adverb 'again' and other similar presuppositions depend on a variable that gives rise to the same phenomenon.
Introduction
Von Fintel (1994) , following Heim (1991) , notes that (1a) has the reading paraphrased in (1b) and proposes the analysis sketched in (1').
(1) a.
Only one class was so bad that no student passed.
b.
Only one class was so bad that no student in that class passed.
(1') a.
[ b. only one class x: x was so bad that no f(x) student passed c. f: x --> {y: y is in x}
The crucial property of the analysis is that the quantifier is assumed to have a covert restriction variable (cf. e.g. Westerstahl (1984) , Rooth (1992 ), von Fintel (1994 ), its resource domain variable (C in (1'a)). The value of this restriction varies depending on the quantifier 'only one class'. Hence it is proposed that the resource domain variable itself has a hidden internal structure, consisting of a variable x bound by 'only one class' and a free function variable that assigns to x the set of students in x.
The suggestion that an expression of natural language that normally functions as a variable (this is meant in the following when I say 'natural language variable') is internally complex and can for this reason co-vary with a quantifier is not new. It has been made by Cooper (1979) to analyze certain pronouns, and extended to traces by Chierchia (1993) . Interesting consequences especially for the theory of Logical Form have been investigated by Marti (2003) .
In this paper I argue that the adverb again gives rise to interpretations that similarly show covariation with a quantifier, and that the analysis sketched for the resource domain variable case can be extended to again. To give an example, consider (2), (3).
(2) Bill was sick on his birthday. He was sick again on Thanksgiving.
(2') Bill's birthday is before Thanksgiving.
(3) In 1995 In , 1996 In and 1998 , Bill was sick on the day of the department party.
Every time, he was sick again on Thanksgiving.
(3') Every time the department party was before Thanksgiving.
Intuitively, the adverb again makes reference to a time preceding the time that the sentence with again talks about. Thus (2) triggers the inference (2'), because the use of again in the second sentence requires there to be a previous time at which Bill was sick, and the only relevant time in the context is the one mentioned in the first sentence, Bill's birthday. The example in (3) shows that which earlier time is picked can depend on a quantifier -here: 'every time'. Example (3) triggers the inference (3'). The use of again requires that for each of the years 1995, 1996 and 1998, the department party that year precedes Thanksgiving that year. I will extend the analysis of (1) to (3) and related examples.
Section 2 of this paper introduces again and the theory of again's presupposition I will use. In section 3 I examine the quantifier dependent cases and develop an analysis for them. Conclusions are presented in section 4.
The Presupposition of Again

Basics
The adverb again indicates repetition, as illustrated by the simple example below. (4a) I adopt a view of presuppositions according to which they are restrictions on appropriate contexts (compare Stalnaker (1973) , Heim (1990) , Kadmon (2001) among others). The restriction that (4a) imposes on contexts in which it can be uttered is given in (5a) (informally) and (5b) (more precisely); c is Stalnaker's context set; c entails p iff c is a subset of p.
(5) a.
(4a) is only felicitous in a context that entails that John had snored before.
Again triggers this presupposition. It is associated with a lexical entry like the one in (6) (see for example Stechow (1996) , Fabricius-Hansen (2001), Jäger & Blutner (2003) , van der Sandt & Huitink (2003) for recent discussion; the entry in (6) will serve as a starting point for present purposes). The definition (6) entails that the truth value of a sentence containing again may be undefined in a world. I take it that a sentence S is felicitous in a context c only if the presuppositions of S are true in all worlds in c; or in other words, S can only be added to c if c entails the presuppositions of S (cf. (7')). This is how presupposition as undefinedness in simple sentences is mapped to appropriateness in a context (von Fintel (2003) calls (7') 'Stalnaker's Bridge'). The application to the example is illustrated in (7); t1 is a free time variable that is assigned a time interval by the variable assignment function g; in the example, suppose that is the interval t1. Thus (4a) can only be uttered felicitously in context c if (5b) is the case, as desired.
undefined otherwise.
If defined, it is true iff John snored in w at g(t1).
(7') p is only felicitous in c if for all wOEc: p(w) is defined.
As a general notational convention, I try to use boldface t1, t2 etc for free metavariables over time intervals and regular t1, t2 etc as time pronouns in the object language (the linguistic structures of English). Later on, the notation in (7") for the information in (7) will be handy, where @ marks presupposed material (cf. Beaver (2001)).
While (6) is (roughly) what is standardly used, it seems upon closer inspection that we need a more sophisticated version of again's presupposition. It has been argued by Soames (1989) (who refers to unpublished work by Kripke), and by Heim (1990) that the presupposition introduced by again is about a specific time, not existential. An example I take from Heim (1990) is given below.
(8) a.
We will have pizza on John's birthday, so we shouldn't have pizza again on Mary's birthday.
We will have pizza on John's birthday, so we shouldn't have pizza on Mary's birthday.
In (8a) but not in (8b) one infers that John's birthday precedes Mary's birthday. This must come from the presence of again in (8a). But as long as we take the appropriateness constraint imposed by again to be (9a), there is no explanation for the inference: presumably, we had pizza plenty of times in the past, so this presupposition would be met, independently of John's birthday. Intuitively, however, one takes John's birthday to be the relevent prior time at which we had pizza. This follows if the appropriateness condition imposed on the context is as in (9b): of a particular earlier time, the context must entail that we had pizza at that time. The presupposition of again is thus specific rather than existential: (10a). In the example, the prior time is assumed to be the time of John's birthday (since this is the only time relevant in the context), hence the inference that John's birthday is earlier than Mary's. Kamp & Rossdeutscher (1994) ). I will follow the argument and represent that element, like other implicit anaphoric elements, as a free variable, to be assigned a value by the contextually relevant variable assignment. A revised lexical entry for again is given in (11). The free variable is the first argument of again in (11) and shows up as a subscript in the syntactic structure in (12) (see also Beck (in prep.) ). (12) gives the interpretation of the example. Note that the fact that the content of the presupposition again gives rise to depends on an anaphoric element makes it necessary to give again that variable as another argument. This was not necessary in the old version (6). The analysis in (11)- (12) assumes that again's first argument is represented in the syntactic structure.
is defined only if we have pizza in w at g(t') and g(t') < g(t1).
If defined, it is true iff we have pizza in w at g(t1).
On this analysis, notice, there is no relevant difference between the variable called t' in (11) and natural language variables like pronouns, traces and quantifier domain restrictions. They all show up in the syntactic structure that is the input to compositional interpretation, and if one kind can be internally complex, so should the other. We will exploit this to provide an analysis of examples like (3) from the introduction.
For completeness, I will mention an aspect of the interpretation of again that has attracted much attention in the literature. Sentences with again oftern exhibit the so-called repetitive/restitutive ambiguity illustrated in (13).
(13) Otto opened the door again.
(13') a.
(13) presupposes that Otto had opened the door before. Then, it is true iff Otto opened the door. 'shut them again' is appropriate because there is a previous time at which Jack's lips were shut (namely the beginning of the opening).
I will assume a structural analysis of this ambiguity in the style of von Stechow (1996) (see Stechow (1996) , Fabricius-Hansen (2001), Jäger & Blutner (2003) , Beck (2005) , among others, for discussion). Application of the structural theory to our example in (13) Under this analysis, the semantics of again remains the same on the restitutive reading as on the repetitive reading, and whatever effects we find regarding the presupposition should show up on both readings.
Anaphoricity
Again on both the repetitive and restitutive reading should be recognizably anaphoric, given the analysis in section 2.1. That is, we should always be able to identify the relevant prior time of an occurance of again in discourse. It has been observed (Fabricius-Hansen (2001), Kamp & Rossdeutscher (1994) , Klein (2001) , and following them Beck (in prep.) 
Discourse Inferences
The data we have seen show that anaphoric presuppositions play an important role for discourse coherence. They guide us in organizing the information provided by individual sentences into a coherent whole. This becomes most obvious when they lead to inferences that would not otherwise have been justified. The pizza example repeated below illustrates this.
(23) We will have pizza on John's birthday, so we shouldn't have pizza again on Mary's birthday.
The observation is that (23) supports the inference (24a). Why does it do that? The context to which the second sentence of (23) is added entails of a time t' that we had pizza at t' ((24b)). When there are no additional inferences, the role of the anaphoric presupposition seems to be to confirm an interpretation arrived at on independent grounds. The example below illustrates that. The relevant aspects of the interpretation of (27) are given in (27'a). The temporal order of the events can be derived from the use of the expression 'return the visit'. The use of again confirms that this is the temporal organization of the events described (cf. (27'b) ).
(27) She rather suspected it to be so [...] from his listening to her so attentively while she sang to them; and when the visit was returned by the Middletons' dining at the cottage, the fact was ascertained by his listening to her again.
('Sense and Sensibility', Jane Austen) (27') a. that he listened to her at t1 that he listened to her at t2 & t1<t2
b. presupposition triggered by again: that he listened to her at t' & t'<t2 t':= t1
Compare Fabricius-Hansen (2001), Klein (2001) , van der Sandt & Huitink (2003), Saeboe (2004) and Beck (in prep.) for further comments on various aspects of the behaviour of again in discourse.
We will assume the analysis in (11), in which again combines with a free variable first that determines the content of its presupposition. That analysis has received further support in this and the previous subsection.
Quantifier Dependent Again
E-type Pronouns, Complex Traces, Quantifier Domain Restrictions
To my knowledge, the first proposal that natural language variables can have a hidden internal complexity concerns pronouns; a relevant early reference is Cooper (1979) . A Cooper-style analysis for the example in (28) is given in (28') (example and details taken from Heim & Kratzer (1998) 
We are already familiar with example (30)-(30') from the introduction, in which the variable -the domain restriction of the quantifier -is itself covert. It seems to be a general properties of the expressions that appear function as variables in natural language that they permit an analysis in which they consist of a free variable part combining with a part that can be bound.
(30) a. Only one class was so bad that no student passed.
b. Only one class was so bad that no student in that class passed.
(30') a.
[
[no C ]] (A)(B) = 1 iff (g(C) «A) «B={} b. [ [only one class] [lx [ t x was so bad that [IP [DP no f(x) student ] [ passed]]]]
b. only one class x: x was so bad that no f(x) student passed c. f: x --> {y: y is in x} Marti (2003) provides arguments to the effect that such covert variables, while invisible, are nonetheless syntactically real. This supports an analysis that assumes additional internal structure including a bound variable as in (30'). The view that emerges from this discussion is that quite generally, natural language variables can be more complex than appearance would indicate, and that that complexity is reflected in their syntactic structure.
Again and Quantifiers
We are now ready to consider the interaction of again and quantifiers. Section 2 established that the presupposition of again contains an anaphoric variable, and subsection 3.1. showed that variables in natural language can be quantifier dependent. We expect that again's anaphoric variable should be able to depend on a quantifier as well, and this is going to be our view of example (3) from the introduction and related data.
We begin with a slightly simpler example, (31) below.
(31) a. Context: I am decorating Dirk's birthday cake. Anna-Lena (age 3) is fascinated and keeps getting in the way. I ask her to play elsewhere.
b. Anna-Lena always went away, c. but was standing there again right away every time.
Intuitively, (31c) says that each leaving by Anna-Lena was followed by an immediate return. The earlier time that again makes reference to is the time before the relevant departure. Thus there is not one earlier time, but as many times as Anna-Lena went away. In other words, the anaphoric variable in the semantics of again depends on the quantifier 'every time'. I propose the analysis in (32) for the slightly simplified version (32a) (I omit the world parameter in these examples for simplicity).
(32) a. Anna-Lena was there again every time. b.
"
t[ C(t) -> [[again]] (f(t)) (lt".AL was back at t")]
c. f: t --> t-1 (the time immediately preceding t) C = lt. AL had left at t Given the general facts of presupposition projection in the scope of a quantifier illustrated by example (33), the analysis makes the prediction that the presupposition of the sentence with again is as in (32e). This seems right, and the presupposition can reasonably be assumed to be met in (31) as an entailment of (31b). (34) would be the presupposition of (32a) using the semantic analysis of again in (11) but without a functional analysis of the anaphoric variable. This amounts to the claim that Anna-Lena was there at a time preceding all her departures -which strikes me as too weak. (35) would be the result of using the original semantics of again in (6), with the predicted presupposition (35b) from (35a). This looks better, even if it is still weaker than (32e). But of course it uses an analysis of again that we had retired for independent reasons already.
(34) "t[ t is one of the times when AL had left -> AL was there at t' & t'<t] (35) a. "t[ t is one of the times when AL had left -> AL was there at t & @($t'[t'<t & AL was there at t'])] b. "t[ t is one of the times when AL had left -> $t'[t'<t & AL was there at t']]
I think that the analysis in (32) The sentence intuitively supports the inference in (36b). It is analysed in (37). Following the same steps as in the previous example, we arrive at (37d) as the presupposition of (37a). The context establishes that we had pizza at Johns birthday every year, but it is not asserted that John's birthday preceded the department picnic. In the same way as in the non-quantificational version, we assume that this part of the presupposition is in fact true. The assumption surfaces as an inference.
(36) a. Every year, we had pizza on John's birthday, and decided that we shouldn't have pizza again at the department picnic. Suppose that we had used a standard, simple first argument of again. The predicted presupposition is then (38): that a particular time t' precedes all annual picnics, and we had pizza at t'. That would be John's birthday in the first of the years talked about. The presupposition is not suitable to support the intuitive inference.
(38) "t[we have pizza at t' & t' < the picnic in t]
Similarly, the existential analysis of the presupposition of again (given below) is not suitable to support that inference -it is too weak. Thus we can conclude that we have found further support for an analysis of the presupposition of again as involving an anaphoric element. The support comes from the additional, quantificational data themselves as well as from the general fact that our hidden variable in the semantics of again behaves like other hidden variables. 
PSP: "t[$t'[we have pizza at t' & t' < the picnic in t)]]
Example (3) from the introduction is of course just the pizza example in disguise. I add example (40) as a plausible case of quantifier dependent restitutitve again. The verb forget is decomposed into BECOME + 'not know'. Once more the presupposition in (41e) seems more appropriate to me than the one in (42).
(40) a. She has told me her name three times.
b. Every time / mostly /... I forgot it again five minutes later.
(41) a. "t[t is one of the three times -> I forgot it again at t+5min] b.
"t[t is one of the three times -> BECOME (t+5) ([[again] ] (f(t)) (lt".I do not know it at t"))] c. f: t --> t-1 (the time immediately preceding t) d.
"t[t is one of the three times -> BECOME (t+5) (lt".I do not know it at t") & @(I do not know it at t-1)] The model railway was longer than six meters, constructed with endless love for detail, and had everything one ought to be prepared for: loads of colourful protesting people, a lot of police, a rolling Castor train, a high security crane, [...] and as the highlight a bridge that collapses in time in front of the train. It did that 471 times during the party. The train had to go back again every time.
http://www.graswurzel.net/281/castor.shtml A final remark: I think that there are data that receive a natural analysis in terms of again's hidden variable being dependent on a nominal quantifier. A candidate is given below (let the notation t x stand informally for the time at which x is told x's password). I leave the details of the analysis for another occasion.
(45) a. The principal called us into the study and told us our individual password.
b. Everyone forgot it again immediately/within the hour.
(45') a. "x[BECOME (t x +1hour) (again f(x) (lt.x does not know x's password at t))]
f: x --> the time just before x was told x's password c.
PSP: "x[x does not know x's password at f(x)]
Some further instances: also, stop
The adverb again is not the only expression in natural language that has been suggested to trigger a presupposition dependent on an anaphoric element. The literature (once more Soames (1989) following Kripke, and Heim (1990) ; see also Beaver (2001) ) points out that a similar argument can be made for too/also and stop. Let's look at too/also. Standardly, it is assumed that (46a) (in which Laura associates with too) has the presupposition in (46b). According to our understanding of presupposition, this means (46c). A semantics for too/also in this spirit is given in (46d), where I combine directly with the associate for simplicity (instead of using a focus semantics). If defined, it is true iff P(y)(t)(w).
This analysis runs into a problem with the contrast in (47a) vs. (47b). It is not clear why (47b) should be bad, since the first sentence states that the conference was well-attended.
(47) a. Peter was at the well-attended recent conference in Mount Kisco.
LAURA was at the conference, too.
b. # Peter wasn't at the well-attended recent conference in Mount Kisco.
Intuitively, the problem in (47b) is Peter. We just stated that Peter was NOT at the conference, and
Peter seems to be what too wants to relate to. This can be captured once we recognize that the presupposition triggered by too/also is specific rather than existential, as described in (48). The context must provide a particular person of which it implies that that person was at the conference.
The only person specifically mentioned is Peter, but Peter was not at the conference. The presupposition is thus met in (47a) but not in (47b), and (47b) is correctly predicted to be infelicitous. Thus we revise our (simplified) lexical entry for too/also to (48c), in which it first combines with a hidden anaphor. [ [also] ] (x)(y)(P)(t)(w) is defined only if x≠y and P(x)(t)(w).
If defined, it is true iff P(y)(t)(w). is defined only if g(x)≠Laura and g(x) was at the conference in w at g(t1).
Then, it is true iff Laura was at the conference in w at g(t1).
(50) Sam is having dinner in New York tonight, too.
The similarity of again to too/also is particularly clear when we consider examples like (51).
Assume that too associates with with 'in the fall of 1997'.
(51) a. In the fall of 1997, the conference was in Mount Kisco again.
In the fall of 1997, the conference was in Mount Kisco, too.
1
I have put the non-identity requirement for the associate and the antecedent in the semantics of also. See Beaver (2001) for an argument that this may not be the right place.
The only difference between the two sentences is that (51a) requires a context that establishes for some other time than fall 1997 that the conference had been in Mount Kisco, whereas in (51b) the other time has to be earlier than fall 1997. So in the semantics of again, we have ti<tj and with also, ti≠tj.
Given the above, we expect that the anaphoric element in the semantics of too/also should be able to be quantifier dependent. Below is an example that indicates that too/also indeed behaves in a way parallel to again with respect to quantified antecedents for the hidden variable. Consider (53), once more from Heim (1990) .
(53) John is cooking now. He will stop cooking when tomorrow's basketball game starts.
The discourse suggests that John will be engaged in a continuous cooking event from now until tomorrow. If 'John stopped cooking' simply presupposed that John had cooked at some immediately preceding time interval, we should not have to interpret the discourse in such an implausible way. Once more, the presupposition is anaphoric in that it refers back to a salient time interval in the discourse, and that is the cooking John is engaged in now. We must suppose that this time interval extends until the basketball game. (53') is a quantificational version.
(53') During the World Championship last year, John would cook the evening before an important match.
Every time / mostly / ... , he stopped cooking when the match began the next day.
We see that there is a class of presuppositions that share with again the property of depending on an anaphoric element, as well as the empirical consequences this property has.
Conclusions and Consequences
We have investigated a set of data in which the content of the presupposition triggered by again depends on a quantificational element. I have proposed an analysis for these data in which the presupposition that again introduces is determined by an anaphoric element. 
